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Abstract- Current practices to defend against cyber attacks
are typically reactive yet passive. Recent research work has been
proposed to proactively predict hacker's target entities in the
early stage of the attack. With prediction, there comes false
alarms and missed attacks. Very little has been reported on how
to evaluate a threat assessment algorithm, especially for cyber
security. Because of the variety and the constantly changing
nature of hacker behavior and network vulnerabilities, a cyber
threat assessment algorithm is, perhaps more susceptible thatfor
other application domains. This work sets forth the issues on
evaluating cyber threat assessment algorithms, and discusses the
validity of various statistical measures. Simulation examples are
provided to illustrate the pros and cons of using different metrics
under various cyber attack scenarios. Our results show that
commonly usedfalse positives andfalse negatives are necessary
but not sufficient to evaluate cyber threat assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Threat assessment is common to our daily activities,
as well as critical to military and intelligence operations.
The various assessments, though different in nature, are
similar in that the process involves information fusion.
From making observations, recognizing the situation, to
analyzing the potential threat and impact of future events,
these activities fall into the JDL fusion model [1], [2].
Research has been conducted to formalize and automate the
threat assessment process for application domains ranging
from naval combat [3] to school safety [4]. Logically,
the objectives of this set of work would be to achieve
accurate assessment while reducing information overload.
Unfortunately, little has been reported in the public domain,
at least to our knowledge, on whether, how, and what to
evaluate for a threat assessment scheme.
Due to the emerging use of computer and data networks
for almost all business and military operations, combating
cyber attacks has become a critical issue, yet different
from that of traditional physical attacks. Current practices
used for cyber defense are somewhat passive. Analysts or
automatic network defense software must react to detected
suspicious activities, by which time network entities may be
already compromised. An equally, or arguably more serious
problem is information overload. Recent research work on
situation assessment [5], [6], [7] proposes means to filter
out and correlate intrusion detection sensor (IDS) alerts,
so as to identify and characterize potentially threatening
attacks. With identified attacks, a threat assessment scheme
is proposed in [8] to proactively predict the next moves of
cyber hackers.
Predicting cyber attacks is particularly challenging due
to the variety and the constantly changing nature of hacker
behavior, hacking methods, and network vulnerabilities.
This is different from traditional physical attacks, e.g.,
missile attacks, where weapon capabilities and physical
infrastructure are better profiled and unlikely to change on a
daily or weekly basis. Consequently, the expectation of false
positive and false negative rates for cyber threat assessment
may be different from that for assessing threats posed by
traditional physical attacks. The question then is how good
a cyber threat assessment algorithm one should expect, and
in terms of what statistical measures. In searching for the
answer, to our surprise, there exists almost no work in the
public domain suggesting how and what to evaluate for
a threat assessment algorithm for any application domain.
Drawing examples from other areas of research, bench-
mark databases and standard metrics are both available for
proposed computer architecture [9] and image processing
algorithms [10]. This work will examine in detail the issues
involved for evaluating cyber threat assessment, propose a
simulation framework, and compare the uses of different
statistical measures for such evaluation. Simulation results
will demonstrate that false positives and false negatives -
two metrics traditionally use in other domains - may not be
sufficient for evaluating cyber threat assessments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the challenges of evaluating cyber threat as-
sessment. A set of statistical measures are introduced in
Section III. Section IV discusses the simulation framework
and results, followed by the conclusion in Section V.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF EVALUATING THREAT
ASSESSMENT FOR CYBER ATTACKS
A. Threat assessment for cyber attacks
A definition of threat assessment for cyber security was
prepared by the ATIS Committee TIAI in 1999 [11]. The
definition described threat assessment as a formal descrip-
tion and evaluation of threat to an information system.
Though formal and succinct, this definition offers little
insight on what and how a threat assessment may be done
for cyber attacks. Intuitively, assessing threats essentially
1
is to predict and project potential course of actions and
consequences of observed attacks. Roy etal. [3] elaborated
a similar concept and put forth a general definition for threat
assessment.
For the ease of discussion and for comparison purposes,
consider threat assessment for missile attacks. Upon de-
tecting a missile, it is imperative to estimate the trajectory
of the missile and, consequently, the target of the attack.
Evaluation of the criticality of the targeted assets and the ef-
fectiveness of defensive and damage control options against
the attack shall then determine the actual threat posed by the
attack. In other words, assessing threats means estimating
the impact that might be caused by an attack, which matches
JDL's definition of Level 3 Fusion - Impact Assessment
[2]. Note that the two-step process of threat assessment
may be done by independent analysts: one predicts missile
trajectory and the other estimates the severity of the attack.
The projection of missile trajectory depends on the types
of missile, the environment, the sensors used, and the laws
of physics. It also needs to be done in a real time manner.
Analysis of the attack severity, though also done in real
time, is based on a priori data, since the population scale,
the assets, etc. change in a much larger time scale than that
of a missile attack. As can be imagined, an analyst may be
able to react to one or few incoming missiles at the same
time, but not to a large number of them.
Now consider the case of cyber attacks. Typical prac-
tices today have network security analysts monitor IDS
alert reports and system logs to make real time decisions
based on a priori knowledge of the network and system
configuration. The key difference between cyber attacks
and missile attacks is that little hacker profiling and no
law of physics can be applied to predict the exact course
of actions. Cyber hackers may have a variety of intentions,
including hacking-for-fun, while missile attacks will almost
certainly result in physical damages if no intervention
is in place. Moreover, cyber attacks typically consist of
multiple stages: reconnaissance of the system existence and
configuration, followed by some form of intrusion and/or
privilege escalation, and ended with implanting malicious
software or stealing critical information. In any stage of a
cyber attack, hackers may decide not to proceed or discover
previously unknown opportunities. This stop of action or
change of course makes it extremely difficult to predict
accurately what the hacker will do next, not to mention
estimating the impact of his actions.
Recognizing the potential complexity and unreliability
involved for building cyber attack models, a threat as-
sessment algorithm has been proposed [8]. The algorithm,
called TANDI, separately models the hacker's capability
and the opportunity he discovered during the attack, and
fuses the real time observations based on the two models
to predict the hacker's next target in the network. The
algorithm, though in its infancy and is under revision, shows
promising results. More importantly, seemingly as the first
attempt of its kind, analyzing TANDI has led to many open
and interesting questions. Some of these questions will be
discussed and addressed in this paper.
B. Accurate threat prediction?
A rarely discussed issue in the literature is what and
how to evaluate a threat assessment algorithm. Logical
choices of performance metrics are the commonly used
"false positives" and "false negatives." Caution, however,
should be placed on the definition and interpretation of
them, especially for the case of cyber attacks.
Consider again the contrasting example of a missile
attack. A false positive in assessing the threat posed by
a missile attack may be due to either a mis-detection of
the missile, a mis-calculation of the missile trajectory, or a
mis-estimation of the consequence of the attack. Whatever
the reason is, a false positive for missile attack assessment
means a flaw in the detection and assessment system. The
same holds for false negatives.
Evaluating threat assessment for cyber attack, however,
is not as straight forward as that for missile attacks. Since
a cyber hacker may arbitrarily decide to stop his attack or
to change course in the middle of an attack, it may not
be reasonable to attribute solely as a system flaw when an
attack action that was predicted likely to happen but never
happens. Likewise, it is possible that an ignorant hacker
attacks a network entity that was not considered valuable
by the analyst. This may result in a false negative, but is un-
clear if the blame should be placed on the threat assessment
system. Perhaps more problematic are cyber attacks based
on insider threats and social engineering. Insufficiency at
the low level sensor capability makes it impossible for high
level fusion scheme to function properly. In short, it is
unclear whether the common perception of "false positive"
and "false negative" can be directly applied to the cyber do-
main. Note that the argument here is not that false positives
or false negatives are not suitable for the cyber domain;
instead, it is that one needs to cautiously interpret false
positives and false negatives for cyber threat assessment.
Section III will discuss our interpretation of false positives
and false negatives along with other statistical measures that
may be used for assessing cyber attacks.
C. Cyber attack generation
In addition to the lack of statistical measures that can
be used to evaluate cyber threats, it is also a challenge
to find representative databases for network topologies,
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system configurations, and cyber attacks. Due to liability,
loss of reputation, and competition issues, cyber attack data
does not seem to be available in the public domain [12],
at least not to our knowledge. Note that a representative
database needs to be updated quite frequently because the
constantly changing network and system vulnerabilities and
attack methods. Interestingly, the lack of validation data
and, surprisingly, the lack of reported effort in validation is
not uncommon in the research community conducting threat
and impact assessment. Often times, a framework and an
algorithm is proposed but little validation and comparison
effort is put forth in the published work. Again, this can
be due to various confidentiality and security issues. Given
such limitations, an alternative is to create artificial cyber
attacks and networks based on subject matter experiences.
A critical component in creating data for experiments is
to introduce randomness, so as to reduce potential bias of
the creator of the data. While a more rigorous Monte-Carlo
simulation needs to be investigated, a preliminary attempt
in generating attack data is put forth. Consider an arbitrary
network topology with a set of IP and subnet addresses and
services and operating systems running on each machine.
Based on this information, a directed information entity
graph is created to represent possible network entities. To
create a multi-stage attack sequence, a network entity is
randomly chosen among those who are exposed to the
Internet. An IDS alert or a system log message is then
randomly selected among those that are indicative to the
compromise of that entity. A next network entity then
is chosen based on the directed information graph. This
process repeats until "no-action" is chosen to complete
the attack. All random selections are uniform, i.e., no
preference will be given to one selection versus another.
Note that a criticism of the above attack generation is
that it follows the "presumed" model of attack and may be
biased. This is a valid criticism, and, indeed, this procedure
is not intended to replace real data set. Instead, it is intended
for conducting "controlled" simulation so as to evaluate a
threat assessment algorithm under specific situations. For
example, we have purposely created coordinated attacks and
insider threat attacks where the sequences of the attacks do
not follow the attack model. This allows one to explicitly
expose the flaws of a proposed model and to investigate
revisions needed for it. It is our belief that this is a critical
step in advancing research on high level information fusion,
especially for assessing cyber threats.
III. STATISTICAL MEASURES FOR EVALUATING THREAT
AsSESSMENT
Given the challenges posed by the nature of cyber attacks,
this section discusses a few statistical measures that may be
used to evaluate threat assessment algorithms. Though the
target application domain of these metrics is cyber security,
they could be applicable to evaluating threat assessment for
other multi-stage attacks.
Consider a threat assessment algorithm that assigns a
threat score, 0 < ti(efA) < 1, to the ith entity upon the
occurrence of the jth event of an attack A. The threat scores
may qualitatively describe the threat level of an entity as
compromised if ti(ef) = 1, threatened if 0 < ti(e) < 1,
and unthreatened if ti(ejA) 0.
A. Normalized Compromising Score
An ideal threat assessment algorithm with perfect models
should generate threat scores that accurately depict the
sequence of attack events. In other words, the compromised
entity should have the highest threat score with respect to
the other threatened entities one step before it is compro-
mised. Based on this intuition, a normalized compromising
score, t' (A), is defined as the normalized threat score for
entity i one event prior to it being compromised by attack
A. That is,
A) ( ) t )
t*(A) = {
m c,Ct( ) )
(1)
where C4A indicates the set of entities that have not been
compromised prior to and including event j of attack A.
The average of the normalized threat scores of entities
compromised by an attack A is represented as te(A). For a
"perfect" assessment, tP (A) would be 1, indicating that each
compromised entity has the highest threat score just before
it is compromised. Averaging t (A) for different attacks,
denoted as te, could then be indicative to the accuracy of a
threat assessment algorithm. Note that, however, this metric
can be misleading if many entities share the same highest
threat score. For example, a naive algorithm that assigns
the same threat score to all network entities in every step
will have t = 1.
Other statistical measures similar to the average nor-
malizing compromising scores can be used. For example,
one can record the percentile rank of the compromised
entities one event before they are compromised. One can
also examine the frequency of a top threat score entities
being compromised in the next event of an attack1. These
metrics are also indicative to the performance of a threat
assessment algorithm, but suffer the same problem as the
average normalized compromising score described above.
B. Percent False Positives and Percent False Negatives
Because of the diverse cyber hacker motivation, behavior
and skills, estimating the exact network entity a hacker
1Readers may refer to [8] for a detailed discussion of these metrics.
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targets on is unlikely. Consequently, a threat assessment
algorithm for cyber attacks will likely give high threat
scores to more than one entity. Let / be a minimum
threshold indicating a normalized threat score high enough
for an analyst to be concerned about. For an attack A, a false
positive shall occur when maxk ti(ejA)>k / but the entity
i was never compromised. A false negative shall occur when
t* (A) </ for some entity i, meaning an entity with a low
threat score becomes compromised.
Percent false positives and percent false negatives can
then be formally defined as follows. Let NA(X) be the
number of entities that satisfy the condition X. Let CA
represent the set of compromised entities due to an attack
A. The formal definitions of percent false positives (%FP)
and percent false negatives (%FN) are given in (2).
%FP
%FN
NA ((maxk ti(e) >= 3) and (i f CA))
ICA
NA (Ci(A) < )
ICAI(
The use of %FP avoids the misleading result of a high
tt when too many network entities are categorized as highly
threatened. When too many entities are above the threshold
B, %FP will be high, indicating inaccurate threat predic-
tions. Meanwhile, too few entities above / may lead to
misleadingly low %FP. For example, a conservative cyber
threat assessment algorithm may only predict the threatened
entity when it is absolutely sure about its occurence. This
will lead to a misleadingly low %FP while the %FN will
be high - many hacker actions are missed. Examining both
%FP and %FN seems to be essential to determine the
accuracy of a threat assessment algorithm.
Note that the use of 3 is not restricted to comparing
against the normalized threat scores. It can also be used
to compare against the percentile and other statistics. In
Section IV where simulation results are discussed, / is
compared against the normalized threat scores.
C. Percent Assessee Reduction
In addition to examining the accuracy of a threat assess-
ment algorithm, it is also essential to evaluate the benefit of
using an automatic tool in assisting a human analyst. Recall
that a key reason for this work is to present manageable
information to the network security analyst. Therefore, a
metric called percent assessee reduction (%AR) is used to
measure the percentage of uncompromised entities whose
threat scores are below the threshold / at each step of an
attack. The average value across attacks will be indicative
of the information filtering provided for the analyst.
D. Percent Abnormal
We further define a metric to track the cases when the
cyber attacks deviate from the a priori developed models.
Consider the network entities that are compromised but
have their compromising score, ti (A) = O. Each instance of
such is referred to as an abnormality. "Percent abnormal" is
the percentage of abnormalities over the set of compromised
entities. Tracking this statistic allows to help determine
possible root causes of high %FP and %FN.
In regards to TANDI and cyber attacks, an abnormality
may occur due to the following reasons:
. Sensor readings: the abnormality could be due to a
false positive or undetected event by the IDS sensors.
. Event correlator: the correlator responsible for level 2
fusion could have falsely correlated (or uncorrelated)
events to an attack. A mis-correlation at this level could
be due to a stealthy coordinated attack.
. Threat assessment model: Incomplete or inaccurate
models may lead to unexpected hacker actions.
* Insider threat: A threat assessment algorithm is suscep-
tible to not detecting insider threats if it assumes that
attacks will originate from outside of the organization.
. Social Engineering: Social engineering attacks attempt
to gain information about the network by interacting
with employees and not the computer network. These
attacks will therefore not be detected by network
defense software or hardware.
IV. ANALYSIS VIA SIMULATION
To illustrate and to address the challenges of evaluating
a threat assessment algorithm for multi-stage cyber attacks,
we consider the previously proposed algorithm TANDI [8].
Note that a small set of results have been published and
discussed in [8]. The focus here is to examine the issues
involved in interpreting and evaluating a threat assessment
algorithm, but not promoting TANDI. These discussions
may also help steer the direction of designing a better threat
assessment algorithm for cyber attacks.
A. Simulated Network Topologies
Two topologies with different system and network con-
figurations were manually created for simulation. The first
one (TI) is shown in Figure 1, and has four subnets, each
with an external server connecting to the Internet. The
four external servers are fully connected to each other;
Therefore, a hacker compromising one external server can
use it as a stepping stone to attack another external server.
Note that the workstations in the same subnet have the same
configuration and allow the same set of network users to log
in, and, hence, are grouped as a single node in the logical
topology representation. The second topology (T2), shown
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in Figure 2, represents a larger network with server farms.
Because, however, the servers in the server farms have the
same configurations and are vulnerable to the same attacks,
they are grouped as a single node with TANDI's scalable
logical topology modeling approach. Note that T2 has more
hierarchical levels than TI does.
Fig. 2. T2: a larger network with more layers of hierarchy.
B. Simulated Attacks
Four sets of attack data were created based on the
procedure described in Section II-C. Set 1 represents attacks
that do not deviate from the a priori developed models. Sets
2 and 3 contain abnormalities, and Set 4 includes carefully
crafted attacks representing coordinated attacks. Note that
attack generation is topology specific. Sets 1, 2, and 3 are
generated only for TI.
. Set 1 - A set of cyber attacks originate from the
Internet. Each of these attacks first compromises at
least one external computer and may penetrate into one
or more internal computers. Fifteen and ten attacks,
each with 6 to 21 events, are randomly generated for
TI and T2, respectively.
. Set 2 - A set of attacks that contain abnormalities due
to various reasons, except insider threat. Ten attacks
(4 to 12 events) are generated for TI.
. Set 3 - A set of insider attacks. These attacks originate
from one of the internal machines, a more extreme
version of Set 2. Each of the five generated attacks
has between 3 to 6 events for TI.
. Set 4 - A set of attacks that are fragmented from a
regular attack to represent a coordinated attack for TI.
C. The Misleading Compromising Score, or Is It?
The first set of simulation results is run on the two
topologies with the attack Set 1. Two different TANDI
configurations with weight settings2 (w(A*), w(A(A*)),
w(M*), w(M(M*))) equals to (0.3,0.1,0.4,0.15) (WI)
and (0.1,0.3,0.15,0.4)(W2) are tested to illustrate the
insights provided by the different statistical measures.
Figure 3 shows four statistical measures, t%, %AR,
%FP, and %FN. For the last three, the threshold / is set
to 0.6 and compared against the normalized threat scores.
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Fig. 3. Statistical measures (t*, %AR, %FP, %FN) collected by
simulating TANDI on TI and T2 with setting WI and W2.
Observation 1: Notice first that, in terms of the average
normalized compromising score (t*), shown in the first
group of 4 bars in Figure 3, using W2 seems to predict
more accurately than using WI for either topology. This,
however, could be misleading. Observe %AR and %FP,
i.e., the 2nd and the 3rd set of 4 bars. Note that the
lower %AR implies that more entities are categorized as
highly threatened when using W2 than that when using
WI. Moreover, the much higher %FP indicates that many
entities are mis-categorized as highly threatened and are not
compromised when using W2.
Observation 2: Based on Observation 1, %FP seems to
be the metric for determining the performance of a threat
assessment algorithm. The results in %FN for the same
tests (the last set of 4 bars in Figure 3), however, suggest
otherwise. Note that using WI actually gives more false
negatives, i.e., more entities are mis-categorized as less
threatened, especially for T2. This conflicting observations
bring forth "the" question: Which statistical measure should
a cyber threat assessment aim to optimize for? Perhaps
2The readers may refer to [8] for the use of the weights.
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more puzzling is that, will the answer depend on the
network the threat assessment is running on?
Observation 3: Note the relatively small difference on
%FN for TI, but the large difference for T2. With a closer
examination of the two topologies, we conjecture that T2
has more "hierarchical levels" and, hence, is more sensitive
to the choice of weights in the current TANDI implemen-
tation. Note that the use of WI gives higher emphasis
of already compromised machine and already used attack
method, while W2 emphasizes more on the machines and
attack methods that are next in line according to the models
developed by SMEs and network analysts. In the case of
the larger network T2, four levels of hierarchy, instead of
two for TI, presents more possible courses of actions for a
hacker to take. This, in turn, leads to the shortfalls of using
WI, which emphasizes less on the possibility of a hacker
moving toward the deeper level of the network.
Remarks: Based on the above observations, we believe
that %FP and %AR are the primary metrics for evaluating
a threat assessment algorithm for cyber attacks. A good
cyber threat assessment algorithm should reduce informa-
tion presented to a network analyst significantly so that
the human analyst can focus on determining the impact
of the few highly threatening attack and take necessary
actions. Reducing false positives is a logical choice because
high false alarm rate typically leads to defficiency, or even
interrupts, of network operations.
The %FN and te are secondary, but still important be-
cause they offer different insights about not only the threat
assessment algorithm but also the properties of the attacks.
The metric %FN, together with the knowledge of the threat
assessment algorithm and the network, may be indicative to
the hacker behavior: one knows what he wants and progress
quickly deep into the network, versus one scans the network
thoroughly to obtain complete information. The metric te
provides a more detailed information about the severity of
the attack actions detected, whereas the %FP alone does
not distinguish between compromised entities that are most
threatened vs. highly threatened. In the next section, we
will discuss a specific case where te and %FN are used as
indicators for abnormal and coordinated attacks.
D. Abnormalities, Insider Threats, and Coordinated Attacks
Any threat assessment algorithm is susceptible to flaws in
the model developed by SMEs. This is especially true for
cyber attacks, where the hacker profiles not only exhibit
large diversity, but are also constantly changing. Attack
Sets 2 and 3 are therefore created for Topology 1, to
examine how the statistical measures may (or may not)
exhibit the abnormalities. Based on the observations made
in the previous section, the weight configuration WI is used
for these tests since it exhibits a better %FP for TI.
Figure 4 shows five statistical measures collected when
simulating the attack Sets 1, 2, and 3 on TI. In addition
to the four statistics discussed in the previous section, the
Percent Abnormal (%Abnorm, recall Section III-D) is also
presented in Figure 4.
oAfhrnr AVgitl %AR *FPF %FN
Fig. 4. Statistical measures (%Abnorm, t*, %AR, %FP, %FN)
collected when simulating TANDI with attack SI, S2, and S3 on TI.
Based on the way the abnormal attacks are created,
Set 3, which contains insider attacks, is expected to have
more abnormal events than Set 2 and there should be no
abnormality for Set 1. This is exhibited by the %Abnorm
in Figure 4. By contrast, there is little difference in terms of
%AR and %FP. This suggests that the two primary metrics
used for assessing "normal" attacks may not be indicative of
those that do not follow pre-defined models. The reason for
this is that more abnormalities increases the false negatives,
but not false positives and neither does it change much for
the number of entities categorized as highly threatened.
The metrics, tP and %FN, on the other hand, exhibit
trends when more abnormalities are in the attack sequence.
It should not be hard to understand that %FN increases
when more attack activities deviate from the prediction
models. As for te, it reflects the severity of the compro-
mised entities, and, thus, will be affected significantly when
averaged with cases where the compromising score is zero.
It seems that the metrics tP and %FN are good indicators
for abnormalities. One type of abnormality stems from co-
ordinated attacks - seemly different attacks actually have the
same goal. This can be due to multiple hackers coordinated
with each other, or several zombie clients being controlled
by one hacker. A cyber threat assessment algorithm will
likely fall short with such disguises.
Consider coordinated attacks as fragments of a single
attack. These fragments, when evaluated by TANDI, would
yield abnormalities - hence poor te and %FN. If, however,
the fragmented attacks were combined into a single attack,
some or all of the abnormalities may be no longer abnormal,
thus improve the overall te and %FN.
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Figure 5 shows statistics collected when TANDI assesses
two coordinated attacks separately or as a single attack. In
this simple example, the hacker uses two zombie machines
to execute the attack. The first zombie client is used to
footprint the network (Recon) and to transfer the password
files (File Transfer) after the external computers are com-
promised by the second zombie client (Priv Escalation).
Fig. 5. Statistical measures (%Abnorm, t*, %AR, %FP, %FN)
collected when simulating TANDI with coordinated attack S4 on TI.
Note that the metrics te and %FN clearly show im-
provement when the fragmented attacks are combined,
and neither %AR nor %FP provides any indication. This
example suggests that the use of tP and %FN may help
identify coordinated attacks. Note that the use of %Abnorm
will not work in this example, because the detected privilege
escalation presents no abnormality according to the attack
model - it is not uncommon to have a hacker start with an
valid user account and previlige escalation will be the first
detected malicious activity. The question then, is whether
the suggested approach using te and %FN will work
in general. More specifically, will evaluating a combined
attack always give higher tP and lower %FN as compared
to evaluting fragmented attacks? The answer is "no" at the
moment, and requires further investigation. Nevertheless,
the results demonstrated here have asserted that the use of
various statistical measures helps to strengthen the capabil-
ity of a cyber threat assessment algothm.
V. CONCLUSION
Combating cyber attacks has become a top priority
in many business, intelligence, and military operations.
Much work has been devoted to developing more secured
networks and systems, better detection mechanisms for
suspicious network activities, and more accurate predictions
of future attacks. Researchers in the areas of cryptography,
networking, and information fusion are coming together to
tighten security measures against the largely unprofiled and
constantly changing cyber attacks. Performance guarantees
of these security measures means the need of formal and
thorough evaluation of proposed schemes.
In the case of cyber threat assessment, evaluation is
particularly challenging, yet often overlooked. The lack of
publicly available databases and commonly acceptable eval-
uation framework and metrics is, perhaps, part of the reason
why little can be found on evaluating cyber threat assess-
ment. The work presented here aims to take the initiative,
and open up avenues for the high level information fusion
community to examine more carefully on proposed fusion
schemes. Traditionally recognized false positives and false
negatives have been examined and shown to be insufficient.
It is suggested that different mixtures of statistical measures
are necessary for "normal" vs. "abnormal" attacks. Much
more work is needed before a cyber threat assessment can
be trusted with quantitative performance guarantees!
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